To re-establish confidence in the federal government's ability to manage financial turmoil, officials must show that they understand why and how the public's confidence was lost. This requires that leaders of the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the SEC face up to their institutions' role in an uncomfortable sequence of events. First, procedures adopted at private firms and federal agencies for supervising securitization activity at commercial banks, investment banks, and GSEs inappropriately short cut due diligence by outsourcing the monitoring and policing of the safety-net consequences of potential defects in the securitization process to private parties: investment banks, credit-rating organizations, and the accounting profession. Second, when the adverse consequences of this imprudent arrangement began to emerge, officials falsely claimed that the difficulties that short-funded and highly leveraged firms were facing in rolling over their debt reflected a shortage of market liquidity as opposed to a shortage of economic capital at key firms. Among knowledgeable parties, this raised severe doubts about the integrity and competence of the officials that were undertaking to rescue the industry. Finally, the panicky and awkward way that the Treasury and President suddenly recharacterized the nature and extent of the industry's accumulated losses in September 2008 created an atmosphere of extreme urgency that subsequent delays in implementation revealed to have been severely and dangerously exaggerated.
The nature, frequency, and extent of modern financial crises support the hypothesis that changes in the risk-taking technologies available to aggressive financial institutions repeatedly outstrip social controls on the job performance of the private and government supervisors that society asks to control the safety and soundness of interlocking national financial systems. To explore this hypothesis carefully is to reframe two age-old debates: (1) about the extent to which society is better served in financial regulation and supervision by policy rules or by policymaker discretion, and (2) about whether and how moral values can explicitly be introduced into the economic analysis of financial regulation.
This essay uses the incomplete distinction between situationist and principled behavior to provide fresh insight into both issues. It expands on Kane (1989) in arguing that information asymmetries in the flow of safety-net subsidies make policymaker discretion dangerous to taxpayers in pressure-filled situations and that these asymmetries endogenously increase the influence of lobbying pressure during asset bubbles and in crisis circumstances. This unsteadiness in policymakers' "situations" and priorities implies that, to assure the loyal performance of government regulators in and out of crisis, ordinary taxpayers need to do more to protect themselves against the corrupting roles played by bureaucratic self-interest, the political clout of large institutions, and the government's refusal to develop and publicize estimates of the ex ante safety-net subsidies generated by regulation-induced innovation.
To counter these powerful forces and bring safety-net subsidies under better control requires more than a reassignment and extension of regulatory authority. It demands a complete reworking of supervisory incentives. A good start would be to redesign financial information systems, managerial compensation systems, and publicservice oaths of office to clarify and better enforce duties of loyalty, competence, and care that in principle participants in every transactions chain owe to one another.
I. Opportunism Versus Character in Economic Policymaking
Whenever the US economy goes into decline, the Federal Reserve must expect to receive a lion's share of the blame (Kane, 1980) . With respect to the current crisis, critics blame Fed officials (along with the SEC, the OTS and credit-rating firms) for failing to control the deterioration in financial-institution lending standards and balance sheets that generated the securitization bubble and (along with Treasury Secretaries Paulson and Geithner) for failing to minimize the costs taxpayers incurred from bailing out distressed institutions as the crisis progressed. Kane (2009) argues that, during the initial stages of the crisis, large financial institutions accumulated huge benefits from investing in efforts to panic safety-net officials and to advise them self-interestedly on how to dispel crisis pressures. To strengthen top regulators' backbone in future economic slumps, it is necessary to understand the incentives and channels of influence that might have produced this situation. The fundamental question is whether reworking financial agencies' mission statements and consolidating jurisdictions in the ways Treasury officials and Congressional leaders have proposed should give taxpayers reason to hope for better results the next time around.
Situationist psychology offers a discouraging answer to this question. It "claims that the situation a human being inhabits, or takes to inhabit, better predicts and explains her behavior than putative traits of character" (Upton, 2009, p. 104) . Upton goes on to summarize a series of prominent behavioral experiments that indicate how situational change can produce "morally inappropriate, dubious, or even appalling behavior" (Upton, p. 105) . In one well-known experiment, subjects cast randomly in the role of prison guards subjected participants cast as prisoners to vile and degrading punishments (Zimbardo, 2007) . In another, participants followed orders to deliver what they believed to be escalating electrical shocks to persons that were screaming in agony (Milgram, 1974) .
A particularly important "situation" concerns fulfilling the demands of organizational leadership in a long-lived enterprise. The ethics of elitism holds that persons in authority (i.e., business and government executives) have a moral obligation to compromise their pursuit of individual virtue if and when this will promote their organization's idea of the greater good. The philosophy underlying this ethical principle is called casuistry (Drucker, 1981) . Though popular in the age of monarchy, this philosophy has fallen so far out of favor today that its name has developed a secondary meaning as a synonym for specious reasoning.
Commonsense ethics (which has its origins in Platonic and Aristotelian ethics of virtue) locates the key to getting better performance in defining and enforcing better principles of safety-net management. Virtue ethics is an ethics of self-discipline. The term derives from the Latin word for man, vir. In this context, vir is used in the same sense as the Yiddish word mensch: to indicate someone who sincerely espouses the moral standards of an upright person and possesses character traits these standards imply. Once inculcated into one's conscience, character traits are presumed to be relatively stable and --within limits imposed by outside restraints and inner emotions -to govern a person's choices in a wide range of situations. An implication of virtue ethics is that, before and after the fact, principled persons care about the morality of their actions (Smith, 1759) .
They pride themselves on behaving honorably and sincerely regret behavior that proves inconsistent with accepted standards of prudence, honesty, loyalty, or compassion for others. In practice, a dual hallmark of good character is a willingness to label one's ethical lapses, irrespective of the personal or organizational benefits they might engender, as mistakes and an aspiration to make amends and to avoid similar lapses going forward.
This makes principled persons genuinely responsive to outside criticism and concerned with avoiding even the appearance of impropriety.
For leaders, it is important not to let a concern for their current reputations trump their concern for building and exercising character. Otherwise, others may manipulate them by selectively condemning behaviors they dislike and praising behaviors they favor (Kaplan and Shavell, 2007) . This opportunity helps to explain why, in the face of growing popular criticism, key industry spokespersons continued to applaud --and authorities continued to defend --chaotic shifts in US bailout strategies. So far, the blueprints for financial reform that Congress is considering ignore the temptations of office and simply assume that federal supervisors always behave in character-driven ways. This assumption makes it vital to determine the extent to which recent US risk control and crisis management behavior shows an elitist foundation instead. Either approach allows that, in difficult situations, society may benefit from temporarily suspending policymakers' obligation to explain their policies fully and from allowing them to pay special attention to the complaints of distressed sectors. But a testable difference exists. Normatively, Smith (1759) and Montesquieu (1748) both stress that the principled statesman should be prepared to subordinate his personal welfare --but not his virtue --to the interests of ordinary citizens. In contrast, to form an alliance that protects its bureaucratic interests, an elitist regulator needs to shade its actions to favor industries it regulates.
The implication is that positive economic analysis can discriminate between principled and elitist policymaking by examining the balance that particular leaders or agencies strike between acknowledging that prudent restraints on their powers contribute to the goal of enforcing faithful service and framing such restraints as unwelcome hindrances that the financial industry would "rightly" expect and enthusiastically urge them to overcome. Agency elitism would be evidenced by the extent to which its leaders use crises to establish interpretations and precedents that cover up its mistakes, inflate its powers, expand its discretion, and extend its jurisdiction. According to this standard, Fed efforts to use the crisis as a platform for self-congratulation and for securing enlarged systemic-risk authority sidetracks rather than promotes effective reform. Kydland and Prescott (1977) use control theory to show that limits on discretion can improve policy outcomes, but the moral issue is not that safety-net officials chose to cast off a series of time-tested restraints on their behavior. The problem is that they saw no need to root these actions in a set of consistent moral principles. As we argue in Section IV, safety-net officials chose a sequence of chaotic, present-obsessed behaviors and sought to justify the chaos by misframing what was a spreading insolvency crisis as a shortage of aggregate liquidity and by whipping up unreasonable fears of an impending financial meltdown. Although Chairman Bernanke has expressed a distaste for bailing out giant firms that were "taking wild bets," his agency has yet to offer taxpayers a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits each bailout produced.
Forward-looking principled behavior shows a concern for reducing regret. The next section benchmarks a series of ethically defensible restraints (i.e., duties of public stewardship) that in theory a perfectly virtuous supervisor or crisis manager would embrace to assure time-consistency. Section III explains that the multiperiod nature of crisis resolution demands time-consistent strategies of crisis management. Section IV goes on to document several major ways in which US officials have failed to acknowledge (let alone to fulfill) these hypothetical duties of public stewardship either before or during the current crisis. These unmet duties are interpreted as evidence that Fed and Treasury officials allowed their agencies to lapse into an elitist mindset.
II. Duties of Stewardship Implied by Conscientious Strategies of Regulating and

Supervising Financial Institutions
Economic theory presumes that, period by period, decisionmakers examine an evolving opportunity set and choose a sequence of behaviors that maximizes a personal or organizational objective function. Rules and governments come into existence as a way for a community of individuals to protect itself from what economists call externalities and from harm that might be caused by weaknesses in members' or outsiders' foresight or ethical standards. Individuals must be regulated and supervised when-and to the extent that-their objective functions tempt them to disobey either the spirit or the letter of legitimate rules. To constrain the choices that self-interested individuals make, rules must be backed up by surveillance and enforcement. Enforcement rewards compliance, punishes evasion, and identifies loopholes. Loopholes may be defined as gaps in a rule's enforceability that make its impact softer and more ambiguous in practice than it might seem on paper.
The modern theory of regulation stresses the endogeneity of rulemaking and enforcement activities. It traces changes in rules and duties to the interplay of economic events with governmental goals and with the waxing and waning of industry pressure to relax burdensome rules or to control disruptive behaviors. Kane (1981) describes regulation as a dialectical process in which regulation-induced innovation slowly engenders regulatory adjustments and these regulatory adjustments (termed re-regulation) rapidly engender new forms of regulatee avoidance. This dialectical theory portrays managers of financial institutions as maximizing stockholder value and envisions private and governmental regulators and supervisors as watchdog organizations that maximize idiosyncratic objective functions that adapt to a set of shifting and conflicting pressures and goals. Whether public or private in nature, a watchdog organization is subject to clientele pressures that modify its goals and complicate their implementation. In the context of safety-net management, these pressures typically seek to influence enforcement and rulemaking activity to generate safety-net benefits for client sectors at taxpayer expense.
A financial institution's incentive to disobey, circumvent or lobby against a particular rule increases with the opportunity cost of compliance. This means that, to sort out the welfare consequences of any regulatory program, we must assess not only the costs and benefits of compliance, but include the costs and benefits of circumvention as well.
What Duties Would a Perfectly Virtuous Safety-Net Manager Embrace?
Virtue ethics and Kant's second imperative (which forbids treating persons merely as means to an end) insist that, across every chain of contracts in which principals delegate authority to one or more agents, agents and principals owe one another reciprocal duties of loyalty, competence, and care. Neither principals nor agents should tempt one another to shortchange their duties. To clarify the concrete obligations these abstract duties might entail, we ask the reader to imagine the existence of a perfectly virtuous supervisor (PV supervisor).
A PV supervisor would be expected to determine its obligations explicitly and to perform them selflessly and conscientiously. To benchmark the performance of realworld supervisors, this paper posits a list of duties that PV supervisors might putatively agree that they owe to the community that employs them. To the extent that others agree with these hypothetical benchmarks, some or all of these duties might ultimately be incorporated into the oaths of office that future safety-net officials agree to implement. In any case, spelling out these duties can help us not only to identify weaknesses in recent crisis management, but could also be used to explore deficiencies in the supervision of the securitization process to determine how PV safety-net managers might have handled them better during the bubble period.
The fluidity of the financial environment means that regulation must be conceived as a dynamic and proactive process. For this process to correct itself at an optimal speed, obstacles that hinder efficient adaptation must be regularly cleared out of the way. To identify these obstacles, it is helpful to draw an analogy between financial supervisors and referees in a sporting contest. In sports, bad calls arise both as errors of commission and errors of omission. Errors occur for one of three reasons. Referees may fail to equip themselves with eyeglasses or other vision aids (such as replay cameras) needed to see the play; they may fail to move themselves into position to see the play; or they may let themselves be influenced either by the reaction of the crowd or by unseen side payments.
In theory, to avoid bad calls, PV supervisors should acknowledge the following corresponding duties: In principle, the commitment to incentive compatibility embodied in the fourth duty implies an overarching fifth duty of accountability. By definition, if real-world supervisors were perfectly virtuous, they would make themselves politically and financially accountable for the ways in which they exercise their discretion. PV supervisors would fearlessly bond themselves to disclose enough information about their decisionmaking to allow the community or interested outsiders to determine whether and how badly they neglect, abuse, or mishandle their responsibilities.
In a democracy, accountability exists only to the extent that the contracts taxpayers write with government officials are conditioned on observable information.
Observability requires either the immediate or eventual release of the information that policymakers actually review when a controversial decision is made. Pursuing this level of accountability would facilitate meaningful post-mortem analysis and the desirability of conducting meaningful policy post-mortems forms the logical foundation for The Freedom of Information Act.
In practice, institutional arrangements do not hold safety-net officials closely accountable for either the efficiency costs or the distributional effects of decisions they make in controlling risk-taking or managing crises. To the contrary and in country after country, safety-net officials seek primarily to avoid blame and enjoy little ex post liability for shortfalls in loyalty, competence, and care. In particular, formally independent central banks are allowed to offer inflated and undocumented claims about the size and nature of the hypothetical disasters that their decisions served to avoid (i.e., the counterfactual "bullets" they dodged) and to withhold or mischaracterize the information that was available to them when controversial decisions were being made.
Moreover, while markets and institutions have been globalizing, national regulators have guarded their regulatory turf. Supervisory responsibility continues to be assigned locally. In particular, schemes for shifting commercial and investment bank losses to individual taxpayers are still shaped and administered on a nation-by-nation basis. This gap in cross-country accountability might be tolerated for any or all of three reasons. First, misaligning responsibility for regulating global firms appears to serve the bureaucratic interests of national regulators by reducing their accountability for undersupervising national-champion firms. Second, it sustains opportunities for rentseeking by these same institutions. It allows important firms to extract relief from their own and other governments when they fall into trouble. Third, it incentivizes national safety-net managers to subsidize the expansion of globalizing firms by adopting prudential regulatory standards and enforcement procedures that promote the international competitiveness of the firms under their aegis.
During the securitization bubble, national regulatory behavior and clientele benefits were increasingly exposed to competition from foreign regulators. In world markets, movements of financial capital and asset values across counties carry into the domestic policy space political, economic, and reputational pressures that individualcountry policymakers cannot afford to neglect. It is hard to resist the hypothesis that these pressures disposed authorities in financial-center countries to expand safety-net subsidies by blessing dodgy methods of moving risks off financial-institution balance sheet and to acquiesce in loophole-ridden agreements for coordinating cross-country supervision (Basel I and II).
III. Benchmarking Principles of Efficient Crisis Management
Economists make considerable use of the artifice of perfect competition. This section seeks to develop a similar paradigm for time-consistent crisis management.
During the current crisis, supervisors in most countries seemed to have followed a myopic playbook.
The difficulties these policies were apt to cause could have been inferred from studying closely the methods that officials in different countries have used to contain and resolve crises in the past. Different outcomes have ensued when different methods were used to distribute responsibility for absorbing losses across banks, borrowers, depositors, current taxpayers, and future taxpayers. Fiscal costs, macroeconomic damage, and the degree to which financial restructuring was left unfinished have varied both with the precise mix of crisis-containment and loss-redistribution strategies a country adopts and with differences in the economic circumstances and contracting environments of the countries adopting them (Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003; Hovakimian, Kane, and Laeven, 2003; Laeven, 2004) .
Realistically, every government-managed program of disaster relief is a strongly lobbied and nontransparent tax-transfer scheme for redistributing wealth and shifting risk away from the disaster's immediate victims. A financial crisis externalizes -in margin and other collateral calls, in depositor runs, and in bank and borrower pleas for government assistance -a political and economic struggle over when and how losses accumulated in corporate balance sheets and in the portfolios of insolvent financial institutions are to be unwound and reallocated across society. At the same time, insolvent firms and government rescuers share a common interest in mischaracterizing the size and nature of the redistribution so as to minimize taxpayer unrest.
In principle, lenders and investors that voluntarily assume real and financial risks should reap the gains and bear the losses their risk exposures generate. However, in crises, losers pressure government officials to rescue them and to induce other parties to share their pain.
To the extent that government rescuers offer loans and credit lines at belowmarket interest rates, the government implicitly invests equity capital in the institutions it rescues. Unless the government requires these firms to compensate it fully for the capital it provides, ex ante wealth is transferred from taxpayers to the stockholders and creditors of recipient firms. Although PV policymakers would report and justify any and all wealth transfers that their policies entailed, real-world policymakers seldom do this.
Preparing for Crises
Regulation and supervision seek to avoid systemic crises by detecting and curtailing inappropriate risk taking before it can harm customers and taxpayers.
Conscientious policy makers should recognize that financial crises will occur from time to time and prepare their agencies to manage the several stages of future crises efficiently. Managing a systemic crisis is a multiperiod optimization problem that unfolds in three phases: immediate damage containment, medium-term industry restructuring, and an aftermath in which recovery takes place (Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven, 2005) .
Experience indicates that the damage a crisis works on a country's taxpayers and on its real economy is lessened by following a bankruptcy-like strategy of estimating and allocating losses during the first stage of a crisis (Kane and Klingebiel, 2004; Laeven and Valencia, 2008) . This is because supplying government or central bank credit support and guarantees to distressed institutions absorbs future fiscal resources. For implicit and explicit expenditures on containment strategies to be optimal across all three phases, authorities must look beyond the net social benefits these expenditures yield during the containment phase. They must also estimate whether some of the resources they transfer to distressed firms might be better used to increase the discounted value of restructuring and other benefits achievable during the restructuring and recovery phases. Kane and Klingebiel model future benefits as a portfolio of policy options that are either preserved, opened, or closed by the containment policies employed. The value of future options depends to a first approximation on the value of the fiscal resources available to be spent on them and on the volatility of the post-containment financial environment. Assuming counterfactually that authorities' decisionmaking horizon extends across all three phases, a time-consistent containment strategy would maximize a multiperiod social welfare function subject to a cross-period budget restraint.
This multiperiod perspective makes it clear that it is imprudent and deceptive for officials currently in office to use a reporting system that fails to record the future costs that rescue strategies generate from constraining future policy options. Unless authorities estimate the present value of the incremental taxpayer liabilities that rescue policies create and pass this opportunity cost through agency budgets and balance sheets, rescue strategies cannot be intertemporally optimal. Kane and Klingebiel maintain that promptly subjecting important institutions to meaningful stress tests is the key to fair and efficient crisis management. The immediate goal should be to assure taxpayers that authorities can and will separate hopelessly insolvent institutions from potentially viable ones and go on to provide guarantees, liquidity support, and counterparty haircuts in ways that protect taxpayer wealth and avoid subsidizing insolvent and undercapitalized institutions' longshot gambles for resurrection.
Why Triage Should Occur Before Rescue
A financial crisis resembles a battlefield. Loss-generating institutions wounded by collateral calls and deposit runs are the casualties. Supervisory personnel resemble emergency medical personnel ("paramedics") required to administer first aid to wounded institutions under continuing hostile fire. Containment strategy, like battlefield medicine, seeks to locate the wounded, alleviate their suffering, and temporarily stabilize their condition. The sooner and more accurately authorities can identify moribund institutions, the better. Ideally, to stop an emerging crisis from escalating, emergency response teams ought to have been assembled in advance of actual crisis and trained on a standby basis (Kane, 2001 ). In country after country, taxpayers have paid a high price for asking emergency response teams to master the financial equivalent of heart monitors and CPR techniques on the fly. Containment treatments consist of standstill requirements, loans, credit lines, and guarantees. Standstills put the claims of an institution's creditors on at least a partial hold for a specified period of time. Other treatments create immediate or deferred government obligations. The credibility of these obligations depends on the government's ability to service them. This fiscal capacity depends in turn on officials' ability to scale back other planned expenditures and to collect new taxes.
Government loans provide funds that can service customer demands for immediate liquidity. Credit lines and guarantees serve to curtail these immediate demands, by committing the government to provide future liquidity support as needed.
Long-lasting commitments make it reasonable for customers to believe that they can successfully extract funds from troubled institutions at any time in the future that a better use arises.
Requirements for Time Consistency
Failing to strike an optimal balance between expenditures on triage and credit support during the containment phase is myopic. Deferring triage activity to the restructuring phase not only reduces future restructuring options, it threatens to increase resolution costs in later periods. Unless officials step in to haircut creditors and control outlandish risk-taking, managers of insolvent firms are led to invest government credit support in long-shot gambles for resurrection that have negative present value. Optimal containment policy balances the opportunity costs and benefits of shifting the last dollar of intertemporal rescue resources between triage, emergency credit support, and restructuring expenditures.
Blindly issuing blanket guarantees violates this condition and ultimately explodes the intertemporal budget restraint. Taking the time to prepare a program of limited guarantees and to write down insolvent firms' liabilities to values that their earning assets can genuinely cover is the essence of prudent containment. Getting this time entails using governmental power to impose standstill requirements. The simplest standstill requirement is a brief timeout taken to allow government forensic analysts and private auditors to assess the depth and character of a troubled institution's financial wounds.
The purpose of this kind of stress testing is to allow supervisory medics time to diagnose the extent of individual insolvencies and to recommend and impose preliminary haircuts on formally uninsured depositors and other counterparties before these parties can liquidate or collateralize their loss exposures.
Accountable and time-consistent crisis-containment strategies cannot easily be devised amidst the turmoil and conflict experienced during an actual crisis. Because the occurrence of a crisis strongly threatens the survivability of a country's incumbent government, it tends to shorten authorities' policymaking horizon. Officials are tempted to adopt containment policies that favor their supporters and to assign insufficient weight to how these policies distort the policy options available to decision makers in the second and third phase of the crisis.
In the face of widespread insolvency, issuing blanket guarantees can make sense to a unpopular government that is nearing the end of its term, but it should never make sense to an incoming administration or to an independent central bank. The liabilities of mortally wounded institutions are worthy at best of tightly conditioned forms of government support. Whatever political and administrative benefits blanket guarantees may generate, allowing moribund institutions on life support to invest freely is bound to generate excess costs over the time span of the crisis as a whole. Moreover, on average, taxpayer losses will increase the longer poorly conditioned guarantees remain in place. A policy of supporting zombie institutions cedes control over the size of future restructuring costs to the machinations of the country's weakest institutions. It also spreads weakness and insolvency across the industry by undercutting the profit margins that healthy institutions can command.
As the industry's aggregate insolvency deepens, authorities may find it increasingly difficult to convince creditors of zombie firms that the government has the political will and fiscal capacity to make good on its guarantees. But there is another way in which extended credit support tends to compound a mess. As long as an insolvent institution remains open, savvy counterparties can cut their losses by reversing or collateralizing their claims. These actions decrease the "haircut" that authorities can impose on them when the zombie's insolvency is finally resolved. For this reason, governments would be well advised to insist that collateral posted or deposits withdrawn during a zombie institution's last few days or weeks of independent operation could be reversed or haircut when its insolvency is formally resolved.
Officials face three follow-on challenges in the aftermath of bailout support: to control the amount of new debt that wounded institutions load onto the balance sheet of future taxpayers, to make sure that guaranteed institutions do not misinvest the funds they can now command, and to cut back or eliminate the guarantees as the restructuring process goes forward. Assuming government guarantees remain credible, firms whose credit is fully guaranteed can issue the functional equivalent of new government debt as long as they remain open. This tempts managers of insolvent firms to abuse their access to government assistance by financing inordinately high-risk projects. Even though abusive "gambles for resurrection" reduce the nation's capital stock, they make great sense to owners and managers of insolvent institutions. This is why, in full knowledge of their role in deepening their firms' insolvency, executives of zombie institutions such as AIG and Citigroup feel entitled to collect large bonuses. Government agencies that guarantee a zombie's debt accept the full downside of its future losses and, at least in the short run, these agencies are entitled to capture all but the most outsized positive returns.
In contrast, a prompt round of creditor haircuts curtails perverse risk-taking incentives by writing down the firm's debts to values it can be expected to service. Policies that force creditor recapitalization protect taxpayers by lessening the extent to which a ruined firm's counterparties can escape their pre-existing contractual commitments to absorb losses.
IV. Duty by Duty, How Does US Safety Management Shape Up?
The ethics of regulation concerns conscientious efforts to set and enforce Such a firm's insolvency risk resembles that of an old-fashioned savings and loan association. Counterparties could easily assess its exposure to increased credit spreads by constructing a back-of-the-envelope guess at the duration of their net worth. High and rising credit spreads raised legitimate doubts about most SIVs' ability to service their debts. From a statistical-testing point of view, it became increasingly doubtful that the problems such firms were encountering in rolling over their debts or meeting collateral calls traced to a hypothetical shortage of aggregate market liquidity. Until midSeptember, financial distress focused mainly on markets for mortgages and asset-backed securities and was experienced predominantly by institutions (such as Countrywide Financial) whose pipeline of substandard loans or securitizations had backed up on them.
As institutions became more and more wary of one another, Fed spokespersons refused to acknowledge the simple fact that sharply rising credit spreads either pushed or threatened to push the value of many firms' risky assets below the value of the liabilities that were supporting them. Doubts about the survivability of leveraged institutions --not movements in aggregate liquidity--underlay collateral calls and difficulties in rolling over asset-backed debt.
A second dogged misperception can be seen in Treasury plans to recapitalize insolvent firms and increase bank lending by buying up a subset of the industry's worstperforming assets at a subsidized price. A PV supervisor would concern itself with identifying zombie institutions and resolving their insolvency efficiently. Proposing to bribe strong and weak firms alike to unload on the government assets deemed to be "toxic" is an absurd idea. A better goal would be to move difficult-to-manage assets into expert private hands at minimum taxpayer cost. No matter how hard the industry might press for this strategy, a PV supervisor would recognize that toxic-asset purchase plans were poorly targeted and could not possibly offer taxpayers a fair return on the funds they were being asked to provide. Institutions that adopted this strategy undermined their capital positions and stretched the safety net in two ways: by having to support the increase in assets being booked and by carrying the losses and loss exposures attached to these assets back into plain sight. These emerging deficiencies in sponsor capital converted de facto SIV insolvencies into de facto commercial and investment bank insolvencies. Then, encouraged by the administrative and political difficulty of failing and unwinding large and complex firms, supervisory forbearance shifted the bill for financial-institution insolvencies onto taxpayers.
Duty of Conscientious Representation. Few taxpayers, journalists, and academic economists truly understand regulatory recruitment and decisionmaking processes. These processes are dominated in subtle (and sometimes unsubtle) ways by institutions that are too politically connected to fail and unwind (TPFU firms). The importance of political, bureaucratic, and career interests in regulatory decisionmaking enhances the ability of TPFU firms to extract rents by influencing regulatory appointments and decisions ex ante and ex post. Within each agency, the discomfort that dissenting staffmembers experience from being treated as troublemakers is reinforced by the lure of the career benefits that talented conformists can gain through internal advancement or the industry's revolving door. All this tempts agency lawyers and economists to look for models and data that strongly support rather than strongly challenge an agency's consensus policies or plans for mission creep.
A PV regulator would not tolerate this. Its goal would be to uncover and admit its mistakes and, going forward, to help society and its successors to learn from them.
Instead, TPFU institutions and Fed spokespersons seem to be uniting in a campaign to convince the world that, however chaotic and costly Fed and Treasury policies may have been, they merit our admiration because they avoided another Great Depression. If this campaign succeeds, the Fed will win new authority and new turf and TPFU firms will wield even more influence the next time around.
V. Implications for Regulatory Reform
Financial and regulatory relationships are layered with incentive conflict. To control this incentive conflict, society looks to law, international agreements, professional ethics, compensation structures, and evidence of personal character. The importance of character as a condition for the proper exercise of political and executive power is the primary focus of this essay.
Smith (1759, p. 263 in one edition) attributes a large proportion of the "disorders of human life" not to gaps in our ethical standards, but to a "veil of self-delusion" that prevents us from perceiving ethical weaknesses in our own conduct. Because selfdiscipline becomes more important as an executive's authority and autonomy increase, Smith's hypothesis can easily explain the persistence of contradictory elements in safetynet design.
Successive regulatory reforms (e.g., Basel I and II) prove inadequate because they are based on comforting, but delusory perceptions of the problems they are supposed to correct. If the financial industry truly wanted to curtail the pursuit of safety-net subsidies, compensation structures, information systems, credit-rating procedures, and lobbying pressure would long ago been marshaled to achieve this result. During the last two years, Federal Reserve spokespersons and industry lobbyists have helped Treasury officials to embrace the delusion that deregulation-i.e., the relaxation of inherited rules-caused safety-net subsidies to expand. This delusion leads would-be reformers to presume that some well-chosen reallocation and extension of regulatory authority will produce an equilibrium set of rules that can reliably curtail the pursuit of safety-net subsidies in the future.
Rules lose their bite over time because regulation-induced innovation creates and widens loopholes and because it engenders and exploits conflicts in supervisory incentives. Complex structured securitizations overexpanded not as a way to take advantage of an absence of rules, but as a way to respond optimally to subsidy-generating rules (Kane, 2009) . The market and government failures that produced the crisis can be more accurately described as desupervision: a widespread weakening of agents' incentives to fulfill their commonsense duty of protecting principals and counterparties against loss. Devising a way to prescribe what James Buchanan (2003) terms "a goodly dose of ethics" for financial supervisors would be a direct way of remedying this incentive breakdown.
Whatever its other benefits, securitization spawned chains of transactions that, expanded federal subsidies to homeownership, construction and housing finance and shared them widely. Across the links of each such chain, the subsidies encouraged private financiers to disguise loss exposures and encouraged private and governmental supervisors responsible for measuring and controlling these loss exposures to short-cut and outsource an unacceptably large portion of the due diligence that they owed to other parties in the chain. Empowering stockholder-controlled government-sponsored enterprises (i.e., Fannie and Freddie) to extract safety-net subsidies in exchange for supporting a market for private-label securitizations of affordable-housing loans greatly intensified these incentive conflicts.
Innovators can move more freely and are bound to understand an innovation's safety-net consequences better and more quickly than regulators can. The result is that any and all static regulatory and supervisory strategies tend to lose effectiveness over time. Rules that block specified ways of extracting subsidies create incentives for financial entrepreneurs to develop clever instruments and procedures able to innovate around the blockages. This is why it makes little sense for Congress and the Administration to focus on reassigning jurisdiction and working out new strategies of bright-line rulemaking for regulators to enforce. The urgent and unsolved problem is to develop ways of contracting with regulatory and supervisory personnel that incorporate taxpayer-based duties of loyalty, competence, care, and accountability into their oaths of office and compensation structures.
The dialectical perspective on the evolution of rules and enforcement activity makes it clear that the Fed has transformed itself into the nation's paramount guardian of financial stability. Statutory efforts to confirm or reverse the Fed's new authority will not help future taxpayers much unless they are accompanied by supporting changes in regulatory and supervisory incentives. In the wake of the current subsidy-induced crisis, the first goal of reform should be to require and to incentivize financial firms and their supervisors to work together to build information systems that can identify promptly the safety-net consequences of financial innovations. This requires finding an accountable way to task TPFU firms and federal regulators with conscientiously estimating and responding to changes in the flow of de facto safety-net subsidies (Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Kane, 2009; Kane, 2009 ). 
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